A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria by Meir, Reshef et al.
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria
Reshef Meira, Omer Levb, Jeffrey S. Rosenscheinb
aHarvard University
bHebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the
common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters
and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.
Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better understand
and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However, these
models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters’ behavior and
the information on which they base their vote.
We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account vot-
ers’ bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information.
We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on local dominance, where
each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning prob-
abilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates’
scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a voting equilibrium, all
voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of possible states.
We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad
class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which
states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where
voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics
quickly converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state.
Weaker convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided.
Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real pref-
erence profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging
equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they
replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger’s
law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner
compared to truthful voting.
Keywords: Voting equilibrium, Strict uncertainty, Local dominance,
Strategic voting
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1. Introduction
It is often argued that people vote “strategically”, by trying to promote
the election of preferable candidates. Game-theoretic considerations have
been applied to the study and design of voting systems for centuries, but the
question of how people vote, or should vote, is still open. Suppose that we
put aside the complications involved in political voting,1 and focus a sim-
ple scenario that fits all the “standard” assumptions: Each of n voters has
complete transitive preferences ≺i over a fixed set of alternatives M , and
each voter’s only purpose is to bring about the election of her most-favorable
alternative. We will further restrict ourselves to discussing the common Plu-
rality rule, where the alternative with the maximal number of votes is the
winner. This scenario translates naturally to a game, in which the actions of
each voter are her possible ballots—voting for one of the alternatives, in case
of Plurality. One might expect game theory to give us a definitive answer as
to what would be the outcome of such a game.
However, an attempt to apply the most fundamental solution concept,
Nash equilibrium, to the scenario above, reveals a disappointing fact: Almost
any profile of actions is a pure Nash equilibrium, and in particular every al-
ternative wins in some equilibrium, even if this alternative is least-preferred
by all voters.2 This observation triggered a search for more appropriate solu-
tion concepts for voting games. These concepts rely on taking into account
various additional factors, such as the information available to the voters,
collusion and group behavior, and intrinsic preferences towards certain ac-
tions. Some solutions focused on variations of the standard single-shot game,
for example when voters vote sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Strategic voting. The underlying assumption of game-theoretic analysis is
that players are engaged in strategic behavior. But what does it mean to
vote “strategically”? Fisher (2004) offers the following definition for what he
calls “tactical voting”:3
A tactical voter is someone who votes for a party they believe is
more likely to win than their preferred party, to best influence who
wins in the constituency.
1For example, social utilities (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001), strategic can-
didates (Calvert, 1985; Feddersen et al., 1990), and other considerations (see e.g. (Riker
and Ordeshook, 1968; Edlin et al., 2007).
2Assuming there are at least three voters.
3Some authors distinct between tactical and strategic voting, especially in political
settings. For our purpose they are the same.
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The two key components of this definition are belief and influence. Mod-
els of strategic voting differ in how they interpret these terms when consid-
ering the behavior of a voter.
Example 1. As a running example, we consider a profile with 3 candidates
M = {a, b, c}. Suppose that there are 100 voters, and that currently votes
are divided as: 45 for a, 40 for b, and 15 for c. Among the supporters of c are
voters v and v′. Voter v has preference c  b  a, whereas voter v′ prefers
c  a  b.
While if truthful, both v, v′ would stay with c, it seems that c has no
chance of winning, and thus a wise strategic decision for v would be to
change her vote to b. Similarly, v′ may prefer to vote for a. A voter’s
response function would dictate what the voter would do in any given state.
Once we define a voter’s response function, this immediately induces an
equilibrium model (or a solution concept): Voting equilibria are simply out-
comes where the response of every voter is her current action.
By applying the reasoning above to all supporters of c in the example,
we would expect to eventually reach an equilibrium where only a and b
get votes. The phenomenon that under the Plurality rule almost all votes
divide between two candidates is well known in political science, and is called
Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954).
Our contribution. After enumerating the desiderata we believe should guide
the search for a proper solution concept, we review some solutions that have
been proposed in the literature, and explain where they fall short of meeting
these requirements. We then lay out our epistemic framework, which is a
non-probabilistic way of capturing uncertainty. Using this framework and
simple behavioral assumptions, we present our response function and equi-
librium concept. In the remainder of the paper, we will argue, using formal
propositions and empirical analysis, that our solution is indeed the appro-
priate one for Plurality voting. In particular we show that voters who start
from the truthful vote will quickly converge to a pure equilibrium, and that
convergence is likely to occur even from arbitrary initial states. We show that
in various voter distribution models, using the local-dominance framework
enables equilibria with desirable properties — with “better” winners and a
“Duverger-like” stable states.
2. Desiderata for Voting Models
We now present some arguably-desirable criteria for a theory of voting.
We will not be too picky about what is considered a voting model, and
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whether it is described in terms of individual or collective behavior. The key
feature of a model is that given a profile of preferences, it can be mapped to
a set of outcomes (i.e., of possible or likely voting profiles under the Plurality
rule). We classify desirable criteria to the following classes: Theoretic (mainly
game-theoretic), behavioral, and scientific.
2.1. Theoretic Criteria
Rationality. The model should assume that voters are behaving in a rational
way, in the sense that they are trying to maximize their own utility based on
what they know and/or believe.
Equilibrium. The model predicts outcomes that are in equilibrium, for exam-
ple, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, or of another popular solution concept
from the game theory literature. It is more appealing if equilibrium can be
naturally computed or even reached by some natural dynamic (similar to the
convergence of best-response dynamics to a pure Nash in congestion games).
Discriminative power. The model predicts a small but non-empty set of pos-
sible outcomes (sometimes called predictive power). More specifically, it
predicts a small set of possible winners, as there may be multiple voting
profiles that have the same winner.
Broad scope. The model applies (or can be easily adapted) to various sce-
narios such as simultaneous, sequential or iterative voting, and to the use of
different voting rules.
In addition, we put forward two less formal requirements, that are nev-
ertheless important. First, that predicted outcomes should not include out-
comes that are obviously unreasonable or absurd. Second, we would like our
model to be grounded in familiar concepts from decision theory, game theory,
and voting theory; it will thus be easier understand, and to compare with
other models.
2.2. Behavioral criteria
By behavioral criteria, we mean what implicit or explicit assumptions the
model makes on the behavior of voters in the game.
Voters’ knowledge. Voters’ behavior in the model should not be based on
information that they are unlikely to have, or that is hard to obtain.
Voters’ capabilities. The decision of the voter should not rely on complex
computations, non-trivial probabilistic reasoning, etc.
In addition, we would like the behavioral assumptions, whether implicit
or explicit, to be supported by (or at least not to directly contradict) studies
in human decision making.
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2.3. Scientific criteria
Robustness. We expect the model to give similar predictions even if some
voters do not exactly follow their prescribed behavior, if we slightly modify
the available information, if we change order of players, etc. Except in a few
threshold cases, we would not expect every small perturbation to change the
identity of the winner.
Few parameters. If the model has parameters, we would like it to have as few
as possible, and we would like each of them to be meaningful (e.g., voters’
memory). A related requirement is that the model will be easy to fit, given
empirical data on voting behavior.
Reproduction. When simulating the model on generated or real preferences,
we would like it to reproduce common phenomena such as Duverger’s law.
Experiments. The hardest test for a model is to try and predict the behavior
of human voters based on their real preferences. By comparing the predicted
and real votes (or even just outcomes), we can measure the accuracy of the
model.
The behavioral criteria together with the rationality requirement can be
thought of as criteria of bounded rationality.
Lastly, Some voting models explain how strategic behavior is better for
society. For example, equilibrium outcomes in Plurality with a particular
voter behavior may have a better Borda score, or coincide more with choosing
a Condorcet winner. Although this is not exactly a criterion for a good
model (a real strategic behavior may not increase welfare), we are interested
in the conditions under which the theory predicts an increased welfare, as
these may be useful for design purposes.
3. Literature Review
This section is a critical review of some prominent models from the lit-
erature of voting under the Plurality rule. For each model, we point out
some criteria by which it excels or fails. This is not an exhaustive list, and
our purpose is not to criticize other authors, but rather to identify pitfalls of
which to beware, and also to identify the positive properties that we would
like any new model to preserve. Outside the scope of this review are theories
that take into account social utilities, sense of duty, and other incentives that
do not follow directly from the voter’s preferences (such as the Calculus of
Voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968)).
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The Leader Rule. Before we start, we would like to highlight a model that
fairs nicely in almost all of the above criteria, which is Laslier’s leader rule for
Approval voting (Laslier, 2009). This is a simple parameter-free behavioral
strategy, where a voter only needs to take into account a prospective ranking
of the candidates (which can be available from a poll, a prior belief, or a pre-
vious voting round).4 The leader rule is behaviorally plausible, has attractive
theoretical properties, makes minimal informational assumptions, and seems
to explain human voting behavior at least in some contexts. Unfortunately,
it does not seem to have a natural extension to Plurality voting.
3.1. Complete information
The basic notion of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) in a normal form
voting game is effectively useless, as almost any outcome (even one where
all voters vote for their worst candidate) is a PNE. Consider voter v in
Example 1. She is powerless to change the outcome, and therefore has no
incentive to change her vote. Two refinements that have been suggested rely
on plausible behavioral tendencies.
Truth bias. A truth-biased voter gains some negligible additional utility from
reporting his true preferences (i.e., his top candidate) (Meir et al., 2010;
Dutta and Sen, 2012). He will therefore be truthful, unless he can strictly
gain by voting for a different candidate. Dutta and Sen focused on imple-
mentation rather than on how truth bias affects a particular voting rule.
Nash equilibria under Plurality with truth-biased voters have been studied
empirically by Thompson et al. (2013), and analytically by Obraztsova et
al. (2013). Indeed, truth-bias significantly reduces the number of pure Nash
equilibria (sometimes to zero), and in particular eliminates many unreason-
able equilibria such as those where all voters vote for their least-preferred
candidate. However if there is gap of at least 2 votes between the winner and
the other candidates in the truthful profile, then it is a Nash equilibrium with
or without truth bias. This is the case in Example 1, and clearly v would
still vote for c under truth bias.
Lazy bias. In many voting settings the voting action itself incurs some small
cost or inconvenience to the vote. The conclusion that a “rational” voter
would often rather abstain (as she is rarely pivotal) is typically referred to
in the literature as the “no-vote paradox”, see e.g. (Downs, 1957; Owen and
Grofman, 1984). When voting is presented as a normal form game, we can
4According to the leader rule, the voter approves all candidates that are preferred to
the prospective leader, and approves the leader iff it is preferred to the runnerup.
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add abstention as an additional allowed action. A “lazy” voter would thus
choose to abstain if she cannot affect the outcome. Pure Nash equilibria with
lazy voters were studied, for example, in (Desmedt and Elkind, 2010). These
are typically highly degenerated voting profiles, where all voters except one
abstain.
There are numerous other models that have been suggested for voting
behavior with complete information. Solution concepts vary and include
collusion (Sertel and Sanver, 2004; Falik et al., 2012), iterated removal of
dominated strategies (Dhillon and Lockwood, 2004), and specific decision
diagrams tailored for three candidates (Niemi and Frank, 1982; Felsenthal
et al., 1988). Crucially, most of these models assume that (apart from hav-
ing access to the full preference profile) voters engage in complicated equilib-
rium computations, perform unlimited steps of iterated reasoning, and so on.
That said, models that have been crafted based on empirical observations do
manage to replicate interesting phenomena such as Duverger’s law and the
election of Condorcet winners (Felsenthal et al., 1988).
3.2. Voting under uncertainty
Uncertainty partly solves the the problem of equilibria explosion, since
any voter can become pivotal with some probability, and therefore cares
about whom to vote for. In Example 1, suppose that v is unsure about the
accurate gap between a and b, but knows that it might be zero (whereas the
gap between a and c is expected to be much larger). Then the rational thing
would be to vote for b, since with positive probability the outcome for v will
improve. Uncertainty have also been proposed as a partial solution to the
no-vote paradox (Owen and Grofman, 1984).
One model that introduces uncertainty is trembling-hand perfection (Mess-
ner and Polborn, 2002), where each vote may be miscounted with some neg-
ligible probability. Messner and Polborn also assume some degree of voters’
coordination, and prove that in every equilibrium in their model only two
candidates get votes. That is, the model predicts a very strong version of
Duverger’s law. They provide some additional results for the three-candidate
case.
Myerson and Weber’s (1993) theory of voting equilibria provides a differ-
ent model of uncertainty, one that is closer to our approach. An outcome
in this model is represented—as in our model—by a prospective vector of
candidates’ scores. From this vector they derive a distribution over pos-
sible scores, and the outcome is an equilibrium if there is a voting profile
supporting it, s.t. every voter is maximizing her expected utility w.r.t. this
distribution. Myerson and Weber prove that an equilibrium always exists for
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a broad class of voting rules including Plurality. Focusing on a few exam-
ples with three candidates under Plurality, they show that their model gives
reasonable results, and that some equilibria replicate Duverger’s law.
While the Myerson and Weber model is highly attractive in many re-
spects, it suffers from some severe shortcomings. One drawback is that while
an equilibrium exists, this is proved by a non-constructive (if elegant) fixed-
point argument, and it is not clear how to compute such an equilibrium—let
alone how the voters are supposed to find it.
Another restriction is that the model is only defined for non-atomic voters,
whose influence on the outcome is infinitesimally small.
However the main issue we find problematic is that voters must engage
in non-trivial probabilistic reasoning, even if just to verify that they are
playing an equilibrium strategy. The assumption that voters maximize some
expected utility function is of course not limited to the Myerson and Weber
paper, and is prevalent in the political science literature, see e.g. (Silberman
and Durden, 1975; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983; Alvarez and Nagler, 2000),
as well as in (Messner and Polborn, 2002) which was mentioned above.
From a behavioral perspective such an assumption weakens the model,
as people are notoriously bad at estimating probabilities, and are known to
employ various heuristics instead (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
An additional disadvantage of the expected utility maximization approach,
is that voters preferences must be cardinal and cannot be described as a per-
mutation over candidates.
Strict uncertainty. Voting with strict uncertainty (without probabilities) was
considered by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), who assumed voters each try to
minimize their maximal regret over all possible outcomes. However their
model (like probability-based models) heavily relies on voters having car-
dinal utilities. Also, they take an extreme approach where voters do not
use any available information (similarly to the dominance-based approach in
(Dhillon and Lockwood, 2004)), and thus all states are considered possible (as
also pointed out in a critique on the minimax approach by Aldrich (1993)).
Another regret-based model was suggested in (Merrill, 1982).
A different approach to strict uncertainty was taken by Conitzer et al. (2011)
who considered manipulations that are weakly helpful in all possible states
and strictly helpful in some. Reijngoud and Endriss (2012) looked at a spe-
cial case where the set of possible states is derived from a poll. Our notion of
local dominance is based on similar reasoning, however the mentioned papers
restricted their analysis to a single manipulator, whereas we study equilibria.
A similar notion of equilibrium under strict uncertainty was defined (with-
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out existence or convergence results) by van Ditmarsch et al. (2013). We
elaborate on the similarities an differences between these models and ours in
Section 7.2.
3.3. Iterative and sequential games
In sequential voting games voters report their preferences one at a time,
where every voter can see all of the previous votes (as in Doodle and Face-
book polls, and in some internal corporate e-mail surveys). The standard
solution concept for sequential games is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Subgame perfect voting equilibria, with and without abstention, have been
analyzed by multiple researchers (Farquharson, 1969; McKelvey and Niemi,
1978; Dekel and Piccione, 2000; Desmedt and Elkind, 2010). However, sub-
game perfection is a highly sophisticated behavior that requires a voter to
know exactly the preferences of all of her peers. It also requires multiple
steps of backward induction, at which human players typically fail (Johnson
et al., 2002).
Iterative voting sounds like a similar setting, but has generated a very
different type of voting models. In an iterative setting, voters start from
some given voting profile, and in each turn one or more voters may change
their vote (Meir et al., 2010; Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012). For example,
voters can be members of a committee sitting in the same room. The game
ends when no voter wants to change her vote. Meir et al. (2010) proved that
if voters play one at a time and adopt a myopic best-response strategy they
are guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game from
any initial state. The main problem with this approach is that it does not
solve equilibria explosion. In particular, in Example 1 voter v does not have
a response that is better than his current action (c). More recent papers on
the iterative setting suggested other myopic strategies (Grandi et al., 2013),
which suffer from similar problems.
When some or all voters are allowed to change their votes simultaneously,
we essentially have repeated polls (Chopra et al., 2004; Reijngoud and En-
driss, 2012). A particular model based on uncertainty with iterated polls
was suggested by Reyhani et al. (2012). According to this model, each voter
considers some set of possible winners based on the poll and on some internal
parameter called inertia, and votes for her most-preferred candidate in this
set. However the paper provides few results (focused on three candidates),
and applies some arbitrary considerations in the construction of the possible
winner set.
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4. The Formal Model
Basic notations. We denote [x] = {1, 2, . . . , x}. The sets of candidates and
voters are denoted by M and N , respectively, where m = |M |, n = |N |.
The Plurality voting rule f allows voters to submit their preferences over
the candidates by selecting an action from the set M . Then, f chooses the
candidate with the highest score, breaking ties lexicographically.
Let pi(M) be the set of all orders over M . We denote a preference profile
by Q ∈ (pi(M))n. The preferences of voter i are denoted by the total order
Qi ∈ pi(M), where Qi(a) ∈ [m] is the rank of candidate a ∈ M , and qi =
Q−1i (1) is the most-preferred candidate. We denote a i b if Qi(a) < Qi(b).
Let Q be the lexicographic order over candidates. Each voter announces his
vote publicly. Thus the action of a voter is ai ∈M . The profile of all voters’
votes is denoted as a ∈ Mn, and the profile of all voters except i is denoted
by a−i. When abstention is allowed, we have ai ∈M ∪{⊥}, where ⊥ denotes
abstaining.
Note that every preference profile Q induces a game, where the (ordinal)
utility of player i in strategy profile a is Qi(f(a)). We refer to this game as
the base game.
If ai = qi we say that i is truthful in a, and voter i is called a core supporter
of ai. Otherwise, we say that i is a strategic supporter of ai.
The scoring profile sa ∈ Nm that corresponds to a assigns a score to every
candidate, taking tie-breaking into account. Formally, we refer to sa(c) as
equal to the number |{i ∈ N : ai = c}|. When comparing two scores, we
write sa(c) >Q sa(c) if either |{i ∈ N : ai = c}| > |{i ∈ N : ai = c′}|, or c, c′
have the same number of votes and c Q c′. We usually omit the subscript
from >Q as it is clear from the context.
We will use a and sa interchangeably where possible, sometimes omitting
the subscript a (note that we may only use s in a context where voters’
identities are not important). Given a state s and an additional vote ai, in
the concatenated state s′ = (s, ai) we have s′(ai) = s(ai)+1, and s′(a) = s(a)
for all a 6= ai.
4.1. An intuitive description of voter response
While the notation we will introduce momentarily is somewhat elaborate
and is intended to enable rigorous analysis, the main idea is very simple
and intuitive. We lean on two key concepts that are featured in previous
models: dominated strategies, and best-response. From the perspective of
voter i, a candidate a dominates candidate b if f(s, a) i f(s, b) for all s. In
contrast, a is a better-response for a voter voting for b in a particular state
s∗, if f(s∗, a) i f(s∗, b).
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In our model, we will relax both concepts in a way that takes into ac-
count voters’ uncertainty over the actual outcome. We assume that voters
have a common estimated, uncertain, view of the current state s. In any
given state, a voter considers a set of multiple “close” states which might be
realized without assigning probabilities to them. We say that a locally
dominates b in s if f(s′, a) i f(s′, b) in all s′ that are considered “possi-
ble” in s. Our key behavioral assumption is that a voter will avoid voting
for candidates that are locally dominated (a standard assumption in strict
uncertainty models, see Section 7.2). In an iterative setting, a voter will
vote for her most preferred candidate—among those who locally dominate
her current action. Our key epistemic assumption (which is new) is that the
possible states are those that are “close” to s according to some reasonable
metric over vote counts.
Tying our model back to Fisher’s definition of tactical voting, a voter’s
belief is captured by the estimated state s, whereas her influence is reflected
by local dominance. The different sets of states that voters consider are
part of their type, and can account for diverse voter behavior, yet ones that
are bounded-rational. Consider Example 1, where the estimated counts are
s = (45, 40, 15). If voter v also considers as possible states where scores vary
by ±10, he will be better off voting for b. Voting for b might influence the
outcome, whereas voting for c is futile (unless v considers an even higher
variability in scores).
One assumption that requires justification is the existence of the publicly
known, estimated state s. In an iterative and sequential settings the shared
common view is easy to explain, as the estimated state is the actual current
voting state. Uncertainty still exists since some voters might change their
vote in later rounds. In a simultaneous-vote game, the estimated state might
be due to prior acquaintance with the other voters or due to polls, and
uncertainty is due to polls’ inaccuracy. While the assumption that voters
know the (estimated) current state is slightly stronger than the one made by
Laslier’s heuristics for Approval voting (where only the identity of the leader
is important), it is much weaker than the assumption that a voter knows the
entire preference profile, or the exact distribution over preferences.
4.2. Local dominance
Let S ⊆ Nm be a set of states.
Definition 1. We say that action ai S-beats a
′
i (w.r.t. voter i) if there is at
least one state s ∈ S s.t. f(s, ai) i f(s, a′i). That is where i strictly prefers
f(s, ai) over f(s, a
′
i).
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We can think of S as states that i believes to be possible (where these
states do not include the action of i himself). The definition, however, does
not depend on this interpretation.
Definition 2 (Local dominance). We say that action ai S-dominates a
′
i
(w.r.t. voter i) if (I) ai S-beats a
′
i; and (II) a
′
i does not S-beat ai.
Note that S-dominance is a transitive and antisymmetric relation (but
not complete). See more on epistemic interpretation in Section 7.2, where we
also compare our definition of local dominance with previous work. In par-
ticular our definition coincides with the definition of dominance in (Conitzer
et al., 2011) and with similar definitions in (Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012; van
Ditmarsch et al., 2013). The novelty comes from the way S is constructed,
which is explained next.
4.3. Distance-based dominance
Recall that every full or partial profile a ∈ Mn corresponds to state
sa ∈ Nm. Suppose we have some distance metric for states, denoted by
δ(s, s′). For voter i and a ∈ Mn, let Si(a, x) ⊆ Nm be the set of states that
are at distance at most x from a−i. Formally, Si(a, x) = {s′ : δ(s′, sa−i) ≤ x}.
The δ distance may be a `d norm for some d ≥ 1. Thus δ`1(s′, s) ≤ x
means that we can attain s′ by adding/removing a total of x voters to a−i
(think of x an an integer, and note that the total number of votes in s, s′
may be different). Similarly, the `∞ norm means that we can add or remove
at most x votes for each candidate.
Another distance we can consider is the multiplicative distance, where
δM(s
′, s) ≤ x if for all a ∈M , both s′(a) ≤ s(a)(1+x) and s(a) ≤ s′(a)(1+x).
Intuitively, this means that the score of each candidate can change (either
increase or decrease) by a factor of at most (1 + x).
A third natural distance is the Earth Mover distance (EM), where δEM(s
′, s) ≤
x if s′ can be attained from s by changing the vote of at most x voters (simi-
lar to the `1 norm, but with the constraint that the number of votes remains
the same).
We can also consider more elaborate ways of defining possible world
states, e.g., where a voter is optimistic or pessimistic regarding the score
of his favorite candidates; EM distance where voters only transfer their votes
to higher-ranked candidates,5 and so on. For ease of presentation, we will
consider the `1 norm, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
5A similar assumption, together with a variation of the multiplicative metric, was used
in (Reyhani et al., 2012) to determine the set of possible winners.
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4.4. Strategic voting and equilibria
Let gi : M
n → M be a response function, i.e. a mapping from voting
profiles to actions (which implicitly depends on the preferences of voter i).
Any set of response function (gi)i∈N induces a (deterministic) dynamic in
the normal form game corresponding to a particular preference profile under
Plurality. In particular, it determines all equilibria of this game, which are
simply the states a where no voter has a response that changes the state.
We refer to the response function of a voter as her type. We emphasize that
the set of voting equilibria depends only on voters’ preferences and response
functions, and not on whether they vote iteratively or simultaneously.
Definition 3. Let N be a set of voters with response functions (gi)i∈N . A
voting equilibrium is a state a, where ai = gi(a) for all i ∈ N .
We next define the primary response function that strategic voters in our
model apply, which is based on local dominance.
Definition 4. A strategic voter of type r (or, in short, an r voter) acts as
follows in state a. Let D ⊆M be the set of candidates that Si(a, r)-dominate
ai. If D is non-empty, then i votes for his most preferred candidate in D.
Formally, gi(a) = argmind∈DQi(d) if D 6= ∅, and gi(a) = ai otherwise.
We refer to r (or ri if types differ) as the uncertainty parameter of the
voter. We denote such a strategic step by ai
i→ a′i, where a′i = gi(a). We
observe that:
• If a′i Si(a, r)-dominates ai, then a′i Si(a, r′)-beats ai, for any r′ ≥ r.
• For r = 0, the voter knows the current voting profile exactly, and thus
his response function is simple best-response, as in (Meir et al., 2010).
• For r = n, a voter does not know anything about the current voting
profile. Thus an action a′i locally dominates ai if and only if it weakly
globally dominates ai. Note that this typically means ai is i’s least
preferred candidate.6
Different definitions of strategic responses (distance metrics, value of r)
may induce different sets of voting equilibria. However, the assumption that i
votes for the most-preferred candidate in D is irrelevant to the set of induced
equilibria. The following is an immediate observation.
6This may not hold if n < m. E.g. if i is the only voter, then her top preference
globally dominates all other candidates.
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Proposition 1. Let N be a set of voters with preferences Q and following
Def. 4 (voters may be of heterogeneous types). A voting profile a is a voting
equilibrium, if and only if no voter votes for a locally dominated candidate.
Formally, if ∀i ∈ N, !∃a′i ∈M, such that a′i Si(a, ri)-dominates ai.
We assume of course, that the same parameters are used for defining the
dominance relation and the strategic response of each voter. For example,
under Definition 4 with r = 0, a strategic move coincides with best-response,
and voting equilibria coincide with pure Nash equilibria of the base game Q.
5. Convergence with Strategic Voters
For any w ∈ N, let Hw(s) ⊆M be the set of candidates that need exactly
w more votes to become the winner. Thus H0(s) = {f(s)}, H1(s) = {c :
s(f(s)) > s(c) ≥ s(f(s))− 1} (either have the same score as the winner and
lose by tie-breaking, or c wins in the tie-breaking but have one vote less),
etc. Let Hw(s) =
⋃
w′≤wHw′(s) = {c : s(c) ≥ s(f(s))− w}.
5.1. Strategic responses and possible winners
We say that candidate c is a possible winner for i in state a if there is
an accessible state where c wins. Formally, Wi(a, r) = {c ∈ M : ∃s′ ∈
Si(a, r), f(s
′, c) = c}.
In contrast with Hw(s), the definition of Wi(a, r) depends on the identity
of the voter, and not only on her type.
We first show that in every strategic response, a voter always votes for
her favorite possible winner.
Lemma 2. Consider a strategic response ai
i→ a′i s.t. ai /∈ Wi(a, r). Then
a′i = argminc∈Wi(a,r)Qi(c).
The lemma holds for any `d norm, d ≥ 1, the multiplicative distance, and
EM distance.
Proof. Consider the set of candidates D in Def. 4. Since a′i ∈ D, it is non-
empty. We will show that (I) D ⊆ Wi(a, r); and (II) b = argminc∈Wi(a,r)Qi(c)
is in D. This implies b = a′i.
For (I), every candidate in D in particular Si(a, r)-beats ai, and therefore
must be a possible winner (transferring i’s vote from one non-possible winner
to another does not change the outcome in any accessible state).
For (II), first note that since a′i ∈ D, there is a state s′ ∈ Si(a, r) where
i prefers f(s′, a′i) = a
′
i over f(s
′, ai) = ai, thus a′i i ai. Also, by (I) a′i ∈
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Wi(a, r) and thus b i a′i i ai. Thus ai cannot Si(a, r)-beat b. It remains
to prove that b Si(a, r)-beats ai (and thus locally dominates it).
We consider two cases. Suppose first that for all s′ ∈ Si(a, r), f(s′, ai) = b.
Then for any c ∈ M , and any s′, f(s′, c) ∈ {b, c}. Moreover, by definition of
b, if f(s′, c) = c then c i b. Thus no candidate Si(a, r)-beats ai, and D = ∅.
Thus suppose there is a state s′ ∈ Si(a, r), f(s′, ai) = c ≺i b, and there is
also a state (since b is a possible winner) s′′ ∈ Si(a, r), f(s′′, b) = b. It can be
verified for each of the metrics we consider (`d norms, multiplicative, EM)
that there must be a state s∗ ∈ Si(a, r) where f(s∗, b) = b but f(s∗, ai) = c.
For the `1 norm, we get s
∗ from s′ by adding votes to b until c, b are tied (or
until there is a difference of one for c, if b beats c in Q).7 Thus b Si(a, r)-beats
ai.
Lemma 2 does not mean that our dynamics coincides with “always vote
for the most preferred possible winner”. It only holds when the current
vote of i is not a possible winner, and when there are at least two possible
outcomes. If there is only one possible outcome, i will not move (which makes
sense). Also, if ai is a possible winner, then typically i will not move, and if
he does move it may be to a non-possible winner. For example, if ai is the
least-preferred possible winner, than any other candidate locally dominates
ai. We will later see that while these situations are hard to analyze, they can
be avoided in some paths to equilibrium.
Threshold for possible winners. We continue with the following lemma, which
shows that for some simple metrics, the set of possible winners is exactly all
candidates whose score is above a certain threshold. Denote by f ∗i = f(a−i)
the candidate that would win if i would not vote.
Lemma 3. Each of the metrics δ from (`1, `∞, multiplicative) induces a
function β = βδ,r : N→ N, where
• For every a, i ∈ N , if ai 6= f ∗i , then Wi(a, r) = {c : sa−i(c) ≥Q
β(s(f ∗i ))}. That is, possible candidates are all those whose score is
above the threshold, which is a function of the score of the winner.8
• β(s) is weakly increasing in s.
7For other `d norms and multiplicative distance, we can consider any path of states
between s′, s′′ that is contained in Si(a, r), by gradually removing votes from c and from
other candidates, and adding votes to b. The critical state s∗ will be along this path. For
EM distance some paths may fail if we transfer votes directly from c to b, but we can use
a path where we transfer votes first from winners to ai, and then from ai to b.
8We break ties with β(s(f∗i )) as if we break ties with f
∗
i .
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In particular, for δ`1, Wi(a, r) = Hr+1(sa) for any i s.t. ai /∈ Hr+1(sa).9
A similar result can be proved for EM and other `d norms, but the thresh-
old would depend on the score of all candidates and not just the winner.
Proof for the `1 metric. Consider first the `1 norm. We set β(s) = β`1(s) =
s− r− 1. Clearly, f ∗i is a possible winner and s(f ∗i ) > β(a). Assume c 6= f ∗i ,
then s(c) 6=Q β(s(f ∗i )). If s(c) > β(s(f ∗i )), consider the state s′ ∈ Si(a, r)
where c has r additional votes. We have that s′(c) + 1 = s(c) + r + 1 >
β(s(f ∗i )) + r + 1 = s(f
∗
i ), thus f(s
′, c) = c. In contrast, if s(c) < β(s∗i ), then
in any s′ ∈ Si(a, r), s′(f ∗i ) − s′(c) > 1 and thus c cannot win. Finally, since
ai /∈ Wi(a, r), then sa(c) = sa−i(c) for all c ∈ Wi(a, r). Thus Wi(a, r) = {c :
s(c) ≥ β`1(s(f ∗i ))} = {c : s(c) ≥ s(f ∗i )− (r + 1)} = Hr+1(s).
Note that Lemmas 3 and 2 together entail that the strategic decision of
the voter is greatly simplified from both a behavioral and a computational
perspective. There is no need to consider all possible world states. Only to
check which candidates are sufficiently close to the winner in terms of their
prospective score, and select the one that is most preferred.
5.2. Existence of equilibrium and convergence from the truthful state
In what follows, we will only consider the `1 norm for simplicity. However
most results hold for other metrics as well. We also highlight that as in (Meir
et al., 2010), we allow any number of non-strategic voters as part of the input.
To allow continuous reading, some of the proofs were deferred the appendix.
Best-response graphs and schedulers. Given a game, any dynamic induces a
directed graph whose vertices are the states of the game (Mn in the case of
the Plurality game). There is an edge from a state a to a state a′, if (1) a, a′
differ only by the action of one player i; and (2) gi(a) = a
′
i. We call this
graph the best-response graph. We can similarly create a group best-response
graph where edges correspond to the (non-coordinated) actions of subsets of
agents. That is, there is an edge (a, a′) iff there is a subset N ′ ⊆ N s.t.
a′i = gi(a) for all i ∈ N ′, and a′i = ai for i /∈ N ′.
A scheduler selects which voters play at any step of the game. A scheduler
φ is a singleton scheduler if it always selects a single voter, and otherwise it
is a group scheduler.10 We assume that the order of players is determined by
9Similarly, for δ`∞ , Wi(a, r) = H2r+1(sa) for any i s.t. ai /∈ H2r+1(sa). See appendix
for the full proof.
10We emphasize that a group of voters moving at the same time does not coincide with
a coalitional manipulation. Each player acts as if he is the only one moving, and it may
well be that the result of a move by a group is worse for all of its members.
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an arbitrary singleton scheduler (see (Apt and Simon, 2012)). Equivalently,
a scheduler can be thought of as a tie-breaking mechanism for turns, when
more than one voter or set of voters have a strategic move.
We next show that when starting from the truthful state, a singleton
scheduler guarantees convergence to an equilibrium. In particular, an equi-
librium must exist. Proposition 4 also follows from more general convergence
results that we will show later. However, we provide a simple and detailed
proof that reveals the natural structure of the equilibrium that is reached.
In the appendix, we show how to extend the proof to other distance metrics
(Theorem 10).
Theorem 4. Suppose that all voters are of type r. Then a voting equilibrium
exists. Moreover, in an iterative setting where voters start from the truthful
state, for any singleton scheduler, they will converge to an equilibrium in at
most n(m− 1) steps.
Proof. If the truthful state q is stable, then we are done. Thus assume it
is not. Let at (and st) be the voting profile after t steps from the initial
truthful vote a0 = q. Let ai
i→ a′i be a move of voter i at state s = sat
to state s′ = sat+1 . We claim that the following hold throughout the game.
Recall that by Lemma 3, Hr+1 is the set of possible winners for all voters
who are voting for other candidates.
1. ai /∈ Hr+1(s′), i.e., once a candidate is deserted, it is no longer a possible
winner.
2. a′i ≺i ai, i.e., voters always “compromise” by voting for a less-preferred
candidate.
3. maxa∈M s′(a) ≥ maxa∈M s(a), i.e., the score of the winner never de-
creases.
4. Hr+1(s
′) ⊆ Hr+1(s), i.e., the set of possible winners can only shrink.
We prove this by a complete induction.
1. If this is the first move of i then ai = qi. Otherwise, by Lemma 2, ai
is the most-preferred candidate of i in Hr+1(s
t′) where t′ is the time
when i last moved. By induction on (4), Hr+1(s) ⊆ Hr+1(st′). So
if ai ∈ Hr+1(s), it must be the most-preferred candidate in the set.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that ai ∈ Hr+1(s); then there is a
state sˆ ∈ Si(a, r) where i is pivotal between ai and f(a) ≺i ai. For
any c 6= ai, f(sˆ, c) = f(a), and in particular for c = a′i. Therefore
ai Si(a, r)-beats a
′
i, which means a
′
i does not Si(a, r)-dominate ai. A
contradiction.
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Figure 1: An example of 18 voters voting over candidates {a, b, c, d, e}. The
top left figure shows the initial (truthful) state of the game. The letter inside a
voter is his second preference. The dashed line marks the threshold β`1 of possible
winners for voters of type r = 2. Thus candidates on or above the threshold are
the set H3(a). Candidates that are on the dashed line (in H3(a)) are considered
possible winners only by voters that do not currently vote for them. Note that
due to tie breaking it is not the same for all candidates. For example, since a
beats b in tie-breaking, b needs 2 more votes to win in the initial state. In the
next two figures we can see voters leaving their candidates (who are not possible
winners for them) to join one of the leaders. The last figure shows an equilibrium
that was reached. Note that although both of a, c are possible winners for the last
supporter of b, he has no strategic move. A different equilibrium may have been
reached with a different scheduler.
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2. If this is the first move of i then this is immediate. Otherwise, by
induction on Lemma 2 and (4), if a′i i ai, then i would prefer to vote
for a′i in his previous move, rather than for ai.
3. As in (1), if i votes for ai = f(a) ∈ Hr+1(a), then ai is i’s most-
preferred possible winner. Thus it cannot be locally dominated by any
other candidate.
4. Since by (3) the score of the winner never decreases, the only way to
expand Hr+1 is to add a vote to a candidate not in Hr+1. By Lemma 2
this never occurs.
Finally, by property (2), each voter moves at most m − 1 times before the
game converges.
The proof not only shows that an equilibrium exists, it also describes
exactly the way in which such equilibria are reached from the truthful state.
There is always a set of “leaders” (Hr+1 in the case of the `1 norm). Strategic
voters vote for their favorite candidate in this set, if their current candidate
is not a possible winner. At some point candidates may “drop out” of the
race as their gap from the winner increases, and the set Hr+1 shrinks. This
continues; in the reached equilibrium, all strategic voters vote for their best
possible winners (which is in Hr+1). As we will see next, the only case where
there are voters N ′ ⊆ N not voting for a possible winner, is when the gap
between the winner and the runner-up is exactly r+1, and all of N ′ prefer the
current winner. In particular, the gap can never grow larger than r+ 1, and
thus there are always at least two leaders whenever there is some strategic
interaction (see Figure 1).
Lemma 5. Under the conditions of Theorem 4, either q is stable, or in every
state st we have |Hr+1(st)| > 1. Also, in the last state a either |Hr(sa)| = 1,
or all voters vote for possible winners. Any voter voting for c /∈ Hr+1(st)
prefers f(a) over any other candidate in Hr+1(s
t).
5.3. Convergence under broader conditions
To show robust convergence results, there seem to be two main extensions.
First, we would like the game to converge from any initial state, and not just
from the truthful one. Second, we would like convergence to occur even if
more than one voter moves between states. In other words, we would like to
see convergence under any group scheduler.
Unfortunately, under arbitrary group schedulers, convergence is not guar-
anteed even from the truthful state. A simple example for r = 0 appears in
(Meir et al., 2010), where there are two runner-ups that are preferred to the
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winner by all of their supporters, but the supporters fail to coordinate on a
runner-up to promote. We conjecture that as in the case of best-responses
(r = 0), a singleton scheduler would guarantee convergence from any initial
state.
We show that if we make two mild restrictions on the scheduler, then
convergence from any state is guaranteed even for groups. We say that a
step a
i→ a′ is of type 1 if a′ ≺i a, and type 2 if a′ i a. We call type 1 steps
compromise steps, and type 2 opportunity steps.
Proposition 6. Suppose that all voters are of type r. Consider any group
scheduler such that (1) any voter has some chance of playing as a singleton
(i.e., this will occur eventually); (2) the scheduler always selects (an arbi-
trary subset of) voters with type 2 moves, if such exist. Then convergence is
guaranteed from any initial state after at most O(nm) singleton steps occur.
The proof shows that in particular, for singleton schedulers there is a
path of best-responses from any state to an equilibrium (any singleton path
where type 2 steps precede type 1 steps). Starting from the truthful state is
a special case, where there are no type 2 moves before the first type 1 move.
The assumption that type 2 moves are played first can be justified to some
extent, since type 1 moves are “compromises” and thus voters may be more
reluctant to carry them out.
5.4. Truth-bias and Lazy-bias
The basic strategic behavior from Definition 4 still allows for some counter
intuitive actions. For example if there is only one possible winner, then a
voter will not change her vote regardless of how much she dislikes her current
action. In particular we can still construct an equilibrium where all voters
vote for their least preferred candidate!
However, the notion of local dominance is very flexible, and allows us to
define more subtle and plausible behaviors. Specifically, by adding a neg-
ligible utility  to a favorite action, such as truth-telling or abstaining, we
get that this action locally dominates any other action where the outcome
is the same (that is, the same in all accessible world states). We can thus
define truth-biased or lazy voters, who prefer to tell the truth or to abstain
whenever they do not see themselves as pivotal. We highlight that the lo-
cal neighborhood considered by the voter when deciding whether to cast a
strategic vote and when applying truth-bias/lazyness, is not necessarily the
same neighborhood.
Definition 5. A strategic truth-biased voter of type (r, k) (or, in short, a
T (r, k) voter) acts as follows in state a.
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1. (strategic move) Let D ⊆ M be the set of candidates that Si(a, r)-
dominate ai. If D is non-empty, then i votes for his most preferred
candidate in D.
2. if ai Si(a, k)-beats qi, then i keeps current vote ai.
3. (truth bias move) otherwise, i moves to qi.
A strategic lazy voter of type (r, k) (an L(r, k) voter) can be similarly
defined, replacing qi with the action ⊥ (abstain).
We make the following observations.
• A T (r, n) or L(r, n) voter is just an r voter. This is since truth/lazy-bias
will never be applied.
• T (0, 0) voters follow the truth-bias model in (Thompson et al., 2013;
Obraztsova et al., 2013).
• L(0, 0) voters follow the (simultaneous) “lazy” model of Desmedt and
Elkind (2010).
Intuitively, the parameters r and k reflect two uncertainty thresholds that
determine how much a voter is inclined to make a strategic response, and how
much to keep his current vote. We argue that it is natural to assume k > r,
which entails that a voter requires a lower uncertainty level in order to make
a new strategic step, than to merely keep his current strategic vote. From a
behavioral perspective, such an assumption accounts for default-bias : deci-
sion makers have a higher tendency to stay with their current decision, than
to adopt a new one (Kahneman et al., 1991). Lower values of k (i.e., closer
to r) correspond to a stronger truth-bias, whereas higher values correspond
to a stronger default bias.
Proposition 7. Suppose that each voter i is of type L(r, ki) or T (r, ki), where
ki > r. Then a voting equilibrium exists. Moreover, in an iterative setting
where voters start from the truthful state, they will always converge to an
equilibrium in at most 3nm steps.
5.5. Other considerations
General voting equilibria. What is the structure of voting equilibria that are
not obtained by starting from the truthful state? They can be more diverse,
but no voter votes for a locally dominated candidate (Prop. 1).
Corollary 8. In any voting equilibrium a, for any set of heterogeneous voters
(i.e. voter i is of type T (ri, ki) or L(ri, ki), it holds that:
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1. Every voter is either truthful, or votes for a candidate in Hki(a).
2. No voter votes for his least-preferred candidate in Wi(a, ri).
In particular, when ki is not too high, this rules out “crazy” equilibria
where voters vote for their least preferred candidate. It is possible, though,
that all voters vote for their second-least-preferred possible winner, or their
second-least-preferred candidate (consider a profile where candidates a, b are
ranked last by all voters, where roughly half rank a above b).
Unique best-response. Meir et al. (2010) argued for a “unique best-response”.
They enforced a requirement that voters only move to candidates that, as
a result, become winners. We show that when r > 0, the notion of local
dominance provides some natural justification for this requirement.11
Observation 9. Let r > 0, S = Si(a, r). Suppose that c is the most preferred
possible winner for i, and b is not a possible winner for i. Then c Si(a, r)-
dominates b.
Intuitively, while voting for b may improve the outcome for i (over ai) in
some world states, voting for c will be at least as good in those states, and
strictly better in the states where i is pivotal between c and another possible
winner.
6. Simulations of strategic voting
We explore via extensive simulations how employing local-dominance af-
fects the result of the voting process. These simulations have two primary
goals. First, we want to understand better the effect of different parame-
ters on the technical level (for example, how long does it take to reach an
equilibrium if we vary the uncertainty level?). More importantly, we use
simulations to test the properties of our strategic model with respect to the
desiderata listed on Section 2. For example, what is its discriminative power,
is it robust to small changes, and whether it replicates common phenomena.
See Section 7.1 for a summary of our findings in light of the desiderata.
Preferences. As the outcome depends not just on our strategic model but
also, and perhaps mainly, on the preference profile, we need to specify ap-
propriate distributions on preferences for our simulations. We generate pref-
erence profiles from a set of distributions which have been examined in the
11We thank Greg Stoddard for a discussion leading to this observation.
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research literature, with a focus on distributions that are claimed to re-
semble preferences of human societies: The Uniform (or impartial culture)
distribution; a uniform Single-peaked distribution; Polya-Eggenberger Urn
model (with 2 urns and with 3 urns); a Riffle distribution; and Placket-Luce
distribution. Urn models were particularly designed to resemble preference
structures in human societies, whereas in Placket-Luce distributions each
voter is assumed to have a noisy signal of some ground truth. See Appendix
B.1 for details.
Methods. We generated profiles from all distribution types for various num-
bers of voters and candidates, which resulted in 108 distinct distributions.
From each distribution we sampled 200 instances.12 Then, we simulated
strategic voting on each instance varying the distance metric (`1, multiplica-
tive), the voters’ types (basic, truth-biased, lazy) and the uncertainty pa-
rameters r and k.
We simulated voting in an iterative setting, where voters start from a
an initial state, and then iteratively make strategic moves until convergence.
Simulations all started from the truthful outcome, except for one batch on
which we will elaborate later. We repeated each simulation 100 times (as
the scheduler may pick a different path each time), and collected multiple
statistics on the equilibrium outcomes. See Appendix B.2 for details. All
of the collected data can be downloaded from http://tinyurl.com/
k2b775e.
6.1. Results
Meaningful parameters and robustness. We observed that results with the
multiplicative metric were generally very similar to those with the additive
(`1) metric. Also, while voting with lazy and truth-biased voters resulted in a
somewhat different dispersion of the votes in equilibrium, all of the properties
that we measured remained largely the same, regardless of the value of k.
We conclude that these parameters have little effect on the model when the
initial state is truthful, and focus on results for voters with additive distance
metric and without truth- or lazy-bias.13
The choice of scheduler type also turned out to be an immaterial one.
While a group scheduler typically converged much faster, there was only
12We also used three datasets from German pre-election polls, with 100 voters, 3 candi-
dates, and no sampling, as well as all 225 currently available full preferences from PrefLib
(http://preflib.org).
13With lazy-bias simulations typically took more steps to converge.
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a negligible difference in the equilibrium outcomes for the vast majority of
preference profiles.
The most meaningful parameter in the simulations was the uncertainty
level r. As we vary the value of r from 0 to 15, there is an increase and then a
decrease in the amount of strategic behavior, with a “peak value” for r. We
can see the effect of more strategic behavior by looking at the number of steps
to convergence (Figure 2), the higher dispersion of equilibrium states, and
the (lower) agreement with the Plurality winner (Figure B.8 in appendix).
This pattern makes sense, as with low r the voter knows the current state
exactly, and often realizes he is not pivotal. As uncertainty grows the voter
considers himself pivotal more often, but beyond the peak r uncertainty is
sufficiently large for all voters to believe that their truthful vote is also a
possible winner (and then the initial state is stable).
This pattern repeats in all 108 distributions. The effect of r and in
particular its peak value are determined mainly by the type of the distribution
and the number of voters, where the peak r increases with n (for distributions
with n = 10, r typically peaks at 0). The number of candidates may affect
the strength of the strategic effect, but not the peak r.
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Number of steps until convergence (3-Urn) 
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Urn3 8-10 
Urn3 6-20 
Urn3 7-20 
Urn3 8-20 
Urn3 6-50 
Urn3 7-50 
Urn3 8-50 
Figure 2: Average number of steps to reach equilibrium for the 2-urn distri-
bution (NumStep), as a function of the uncertainty parameter r. Each group
of lines marks a different number of voters, and peaks at a different value of
r. Recall that for r = n (denoted by ‘max’), we have no strategic steps. This
serves as our baseline.
Quality of winner. In the Placket-Luce distribution, the quality of a winner
can be determined according to its rank in the ground truth used to generate
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the profile. In the other distributions there is no notion of ground truth,
and hence we measured how often the equilibrium winner agreed with the
(truthful) winner of another common voting system, which takes the entire
preference profile into account (Borda, Copland, Maximin). We also mea-
sured how often the winner was a Condorcet winner (out of cases where one
exists), and the social welfare of voters (assuming Borda utilities).
According to Borda, Copland, Condorcet consistency, social welfare (see
Figure 3) and the ground truth, a clear pattern was observed almost in-
variably across all distributions. As strategic activity increases, so does the
winner quality.14 Best winner quality is attained at peak r or very close to
it (see Figures B.9,B.11 in the appendix).
In particular, these results are interesting for the Single-Peaked profiles.
In such profiles there is always a Condorcet winner, which is the median
candidate. As voters strategize more under Plurality, they in fact get closer
to the outcome of the strategy-proof median mechanism.
Figure 3: The increase in voters’ social welfare, compared to the truthful
Plurality outcome.
Duverger Law. The positive effect of more strategic behavior on the concen-
tration of votes was remarkably clear across all distributions. As r gets closer
to the peak value, over 75% of the voters (all voters in some distributions)
end up voting for only two candidates. This holds both in distributions like
Uniform and Placket-Luce where no candidate initially has a strong advan-
14There was typically no higher agreement with the Maximin winner. Also, in the Urn
models strategic behavior did not in general improve consistency with Borda.
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tage (see Figure B.12 in appendix), and in distributions like 2-Urn where
there are two leading candidates to begin with (Figure 4).
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Urn2 6-10 
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Urn2 8-20 
Urn2 6-50 
Urn2 7-50 
Urn2 8-50 
Figure 4: The fraction of simulations in 2-Urn distribution in which all
voters ended up voting for only two candidates (TotalDuverger).
Real preference datasets. In general, all of our empirical findings were repli-
cated on the real preference data, but since each instance has a different
number of voters and candidates, results are more qualitative.
In all three German election datasets we observed similar patterns as
above: nearly all supporters of the third candidate deserted it to join one of
the leaders. In two datasets this did not change the identity of the Plurality
winner. In the third dataset the strategic behavior (for any r between 1 and
30) replaced the Plurality winner with the Condorcet winner.
Similarly, in most of the PrefLib datasets there was a clear winner, and
thus there were none-to-few strategic moves. Votes were typically already
quite concentrated for the two leaders in the initial truthful profile, but this
concentration increased with strategic activity (Duverger’s law). In the few
instances where the identity of the winner changed, it usually replaced the
Plurality winner with the Condorcet winner.
Non-truthful starting profile and Discriminative power. We ran a batch of
simulations starting from a voting profile chosen uniformly at random. While
we observed voters sometimes switching back and forth between candidates,
and despite having no formal guarantee of convergence, all simulations even-
tually converged to an equilibrium.
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We generally observe that the dependency of various attributes in r is
more complex (there is no clear “peak r”), but r and n are still the most
significant factors. For example, we see much more strategic activity with
r = 0 as in a random state there are more likely to be many pivotal voters
than in the truthful state.
Other properties observed above such as Duverger’s law, and an increase
in winner quality are replicated when starting from a random profile (see e.g.
Figure B.10 in appendix).
More importantly, simulations with random initial states enable us to
test the discriminative power of the model.15 Without strategic behavior, we
would not expect any candidate to win in a large fraction of the instances
(e.g., in the uniform distribution every candidate should win in ∼ 1/m of the
instances). However when voters are strategic we get that most of the simu-
lations select the same winner regardless of the initial state, which indicates
high discriminative power (Figure 5).
Figure 5: The fraction of simulations (out of 100 random initial states for
each preference profile) that ended with the same winner (WinnerConsis-
tency). Note that around peak r we have 75%− 85% of the starting points
leading to the same winner, regardless of the number of candidates. Very
similar patterns were observed for the Urn models and Placket-Luce.
Diverse population. Finally, we repeated some of our simulations with hetero-
geneous voters, where ri are sampled uniformly i.i.d. from {0, 1, . . . , n/m}.
Despite the fact that our convergence proofs do not cover heterogeneous
15Looking only on simulations from the truthful profile does not mean much in that
respect. Note for example that with r = n, we would get “perfect” discriminative power
as the truthful Plurality winner is always selected.
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populations, convergence was just as robust. Not only that all simulations
converged, typically all invariants that we proved for the homogenous case
(e.g., that a voter always compromises for less desirable candidates) also hold
in the diverse case.16
The diverse simulations replicated nearly all the patterns of strategic
voting across all distributions. Notably, although we used the same sim-
ple distribution of ri values in all simulations, effects of strategic behavior
were always approximately as strong as in the peak r value of every profile
distribution and across most measured properties.
Winner quality was also generally comparable to peak r.17
Regarding Duverger’s law, while the number of votes to the top 2 can-
didates was generally quite similar to the one in peak r (sometimes even
higher), with diverse population there were much fewer instances where only
two candidates received votes. See Figure 6. Looking at a typical equilib-
rium profile reveals that it has a much more “natural” dispersion, with many
voters voting for the two leaders, but also some voters (with either very high
or very low uncertainty values) voting for other candidates.
7. Discussion
In (Abramson et al., 1992), sophisticated (strategic) voting based on ex-
pected utility maximization is defended on the grounds that it “...is a sim-
plification of reality that seeks to capture the most salient features of actual
situations. Many voters may see some candidates as having real chances of
winning and others as likely losers, and they may weigh these perceptions
against the relative attractiveness of the candidates.”
Our theory is also a simplification of reality, and applies similar logic to
explain and justify strategic voting. However, the local-dominance approach
allows voters to take into account both “chances of winning” and “relative
attractiveness”, without regressing to probabilistic calculations and expected
utility maximization.
7.1. The model and the desiderata
We summarize by showing how model of local dominance answers to the
desiderata we presented in Section 2.
16There were as few as 4 violations of the invariant out of ∼ 120, 000 strategic steps.
17Interestingly, the Placket-Luce distribution is an exception, where diverse population
led to degradation in the winner quality according to the ground truth, but not according
to the other measures.
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Figure 6: In the top figure we can see that with diverse population, votes
were just as concentrated as with fixed population with peak r, across all
distributions. The bottom figure shows that with fixed r, this concentration
is due to many instances where only two candidates get votes, while this is
not the case with diverse population.
• Looking at theoretical criteria, our model is grounded in traditional
game-theoretic concepts: voters are trying to maximize their utility,
and results are in equilibrium. Further links to decision theory and
classical notions of rationality are detailed in Section 7.2.
When all voters are of the same type, an equilibrium always exists, and
convergence of local-dominance dynamics is guaranteed under rather
week conditions. Our simulations show existence and convergence even
without these conditions, and demonstrate high discriminative power.
The model is broad enough to encompass different scenarios such as
simultaneous, sequential and iterative voting, and to account for be-
haviors such as truth-bias and lazy-bias. Our definitions could be eas-
ily extended to other positional scoring rules, although it is an open
question whether our results would still hold.18 Furthermore, as Propo-
sition 8 shows, preposterous equilibria are unlikely.
18Extensions to other voting rules are simple with metrics like EM distance, but may
be ill-defined with other metrics.
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• As argued above, voters in our model fit the behavioral criteria we
posed, as they avoid complex complex computations. Moreover, as
Lemma 3 shows, voters do not even need to consider the entire space
of possible states, but merely to check which candidates have sufficient
score to become possible winners. Our informational assumptions are
rather weak and plausible, as we argue in the end of Section 4.1.
• Regarding the scientific criteria, once we set the distance metric, ev-
ery voter can be described by a single parameter (two in the case of
lazy or truth-biased voters), which has a clear interpretation as her cer-
tainty level. Our extensive simulations demonstrate robustness to the
order in which voters play (including whether they act simultaneously
or not), and that changing the parameters results in a rather smooth
transition. Simulations also show that the model replicates patterns
that are common in the real world such as the Duverger Law, and re-
sulting equilibria, especially with diverse population, seem reasonable.
Experimental validation as outside the scope of this work.
Finally, it is shown that strategic behavior yields a better winner for the
society according to various measures of quality (compared to the truthful
Plurality winner).
7.2. Epistemic foundations and rationality
We can phrase dominance relations in terms of modal logic. Consider a
Kripke structure over states where S are the states accessible from s = sa.
Then “bi S-beats ai in state s” can be written as s |= (f(bi, s) i f(ai, s)).
Similarly, “bi S-dominates ai” means s |= (f(bi, s) i f(ai, s))∧(f(bi, s) i
f(ai, s)) (bi is necessarily at least as good, and possible a better action than
ai). We note that Si(a, k) defines a Kripke structure that is reflexive and
symmetric but non-transitive.
A common semantic interpretation of the modal operator P is “P is
known”.19 According to this, we can naturally interpret “bi S-beats ai in
state s” as “in state s, i does not know that voting for ai is at least as good
as voting for bi”. Thus “bi S-dominates ai in state s” means that i knows
that bi is at least as good as ai, but does not know that ai is at least as good
as bi.
19An alternative notation KiP is sometimes used for the statement “P is known to
agent i”. See, for example, (Aumann, 1999).
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In our model, S(a) is not uniquely defined, and in fact even the same voter
uses both Si(a, r), Si(a, k), where r < k. Since Si(a, r) ⊆ Si(a, k), a straight-
forward extension of the epistemic interpretation is to add certainty levels,
where a larger (in terms of containment) set of accessible states indicates
lower certainty.
Local dominance and rationality. According to the standard non-Bayesian
incomplete information model (due to Aumann (1995; 1999)), a player i
playing strategy ai at some world state pi is rational, if there is no other
strategy a′i that yields a same or better outcome in all states accessible from
pi (and in some states strictly better).
In other words, rationality under strict uncertainty according to Aumann
simply means that players avoid locally dominated strategies. Voting equilib-
ria in our model are therefore rational (Prop. 1). Our model is more specific
in that it specifies a particular dynamic of how voters act when their current
strategy is dominated.
Another difference is that in Aumann’s models the accessibility relation is
a partition, and in particular transitive. Other papers such as (Bicchieri and
Antonelli, 1995) do not make any assumptions on the accessibility relation
other than consistency. In our model the relation is based on distance, and
in particular it is non-transitive (if pi is close to pi′, and pi′ is close to pi′′, then
it may not hold that pi is close to pi′′).
Local dominance and voting. Dominance within a restricted set of states was
considered by several recent papers. In (Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012; van
Ditmarsch et al., 2013) the assumption is that voters information sets can be
described as a partition Π, as in the Aumann model. Reijngoud and Endriss
say that a voter has an incentive to Π-manipulate using ballot P ′i (under
profile P), if she weakly gains by voting P ′i in every state that is “equivalent”
to P according to Π.20 In the special case of Plurality, the definition coincides
local dominance: Consider Def. 2, where we set S to be all states equivalent
to a under Π. Then a′i S-dominates ai iff i has an incentive to Π-manipulate
using ballot a′i. In the terminology of (van Ditmarsch et al., 2013), voter i
knows ‘de re’ that she can weakly successfully manipulate. Our definition of
local dominance also coincides with the definition of dominance in (Conitzer
et al., 2011), which do not make any assumption on the “information set” S.
In our work the accessibility relation is defined by a distance metric and
is not a partition. Still, many of the definitions in (Reijngoud and Endriss,
20The definition is for arbitrary voting rules.
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2012; van Ditmarsch et al., 2013) can be applied just the same in our case.
In particular, a combination of these works can be used to extend the notion
of local dominance to other voting rules.
7.3. Conclusion and future work
We see a unifying theory as the one we present as a productive step in
the quest to understand voting. We hope that future researchers will find
our theoretical framework useful for formulating new, more specific, voting
behaviors. Furthermore, our particular distance-based model can serve as a
strong baseline for competing theories. Experiments with human voters will
be important to settle how close each of these theories comes in adequately
describing human voting behavior.
On the technical level, we conjecture that stronger convergence properties
can be proved; in particular, that there are no cycles in voting games with
voters of the same type, and that a voting equilibrium exists even in games
with heterogeneous voters.
We also believe that distance-based local dominance, with the necessary
adaptations, can provide a useful non-probabilistic framework for uncertainty
in other classes of games where there are natural distance metrics over states,
such as congestion games.
Finally, insights based on our theory, for example on how voters’ uncer-
tainty level affects quality of the outcome, can be useful in designing better
voting mechanisms.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 3. Each of the metrics δ from (`1, `∞, multiplicative) induces a
function β = βδ,r : N→ N, where
• For every a, i ∈ N , if ai 6= f ∗i , then Wi(a, r) = {c : sa−i(c) ≥Q
β(s(f ∗i ))}. That is, possible candidates are all those whose score is
above the threshold, which is a function of the score of the winner.21
21We break ties with β(s(f∗i )) as if we break ties with f
∗
i .
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• β(s) is weakly increasing in s.
In particular, for δ`1, Wi(a, r) = Hr+1(sa) for any i s.t. ai /∈ Hr+1(sa).
Similarly, for δ`∞, Wi(a, r) = H2r+1(sa) for any i s.t. ai /∈ H2r+1(sa). A
similar result can be proved for EMD and other `d norms, but the threshold
would depend on the score of all candidates and not just the winner.
Proof. Consider first the `1 norm. We set β(s) = β`1(s) = s− r− 1. Clearly,
f ∗i is a possible winner and s(f
∗
i ) > β(a). Assume c 6= f ∗i , then s(c) 6=Q
β(s(f ∗i )). If s(c) > β(s(f
∗
i )), consider the state s
′ ∈ Si(a, r) where c has r
additional votes. We have that
s′(c) + 1 = s(c) + r + 1 > β(s(f ∗i )) + r + 1 = s(f
∗
i ),
thus f(s′, c) = c. In contrast, if s(c) < β(s∗i ), then in any s
′ ∈ Si(a, r),
s′(f ∗i )− s′(c) > 1 and thus c cannot win. Finally,
Wi(a, r) = {c : s(c) ≥ β`1(s(f ∗i ))} = {c : s(c) ≥ s(f ∗i )− (r + 1)} = Hr+1(s).
Similarly, for `∞ we set β(s) = β`∞(s) = s − 2r − 1. The critical state
s′ is where c gets r additional votes, and we subtract r votes from all other
candidates (including f ∗i ).
For the multiplicative distance, we set β(s) =
⌈⌈
s
1+r
⌉
/(1 + r)
⌉ − 1. In
the critical state we multiply the score of c by (1 + r), getting s′(c) =
bs(c)(1 + r)c, and divide the score of all other candidates by (1 + r), so
e.g. for f ∗i , we get s
′(f ∗i ) =
⌈
s(f∗i )
1+r
⌉
. Thus
f(s′, c) = c ⇐⇒
s′(c) + 1 > s′(f ∗i ) ⇐⇒
bs(c)(1 + r)c+ 1 >
⌈
s(f ∗i )
1 + r
⌉
⇐⇒
s(c) >
⌈⌈
s(f ∗i )
1 + r
⌉
/(1 + r)
⌉
− 1 = β(s(f ∗i )).
Theorem 10. Suppose that all voters are of type r and using any norm for
which Lemmas 2,3 apply. Then a voting equilibrium exists. Moreover, in an
iterative setting where voters start from the truthful state, for any singleton
scheduler, they will always converge to an equilibrium in at most n(m − 1)
steps.
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Proof. If the truthful state q is stable, then we are done. Thus assume it
is not. Let at (and st) be the voting profile after t steps from the initial
truthful vote a0 = q. Let ai
i→ a′i be a move of voter i at state s = sat to
state s′ = sat+1 .
We claim that the following hold throughout the game.
1. ai /∈ Wi(a, r). Voters only leave non-possible winners.
2. After a step ai
i→ a′i at time t, ai /∈ Wj(at′ , r) at any later time t′, for
any voter j.
3. a′i ≺i ai. I.e., voters always “compromise” by voting for a less preferred
candidate.
4. maxa∈A s′(a) ≥ maxa∈A s(a). I.e., the score of the winner never de-
creases.
5. For all j, all t′ > t after the first step of j, Wj(at
′
, r) ⊆ Wj(at, r). I.e.,
the set of possible winners can only shrink (after the first move).
We prove this by a complete induction.
1. If this is the first move of i then ai = qi. Otherwise, by Lemma 2, ai is
the most preferred candidate of i in Wi(a
t′ , r) where t′ is the time when
i last moved. By induction on (5), Wi(a, r) ⊆ Wi(at′ , r). So either ai
is not a possible winner in a (and the we are done), or it must be the
most preferred candidate in Wi(a, r). Assume, toward a contradiction,
that ai ∈ Wi(a, r), then there is a state in Si(a, r) where i is pivotal
between ai and f(a). With any other action, f(a) = c ≺i ai would
win. Therefore ai Si(a, r)-beats any other candidate including a
′
i. In
particular, a′i does not Si(a, r)-dominate ai, which is a contradiction.
2. The scores by which different voters determine possible winners are
almost identical, and the score of ai may differ by at most 1 vote be-
tween a−i and a−j. When i moves then by (1) and Lemma 3 sa−i(ai) <
β(s(f(a))), and thus sa−j(ai) < β(s(f(a))) + 1. Thus while j may still
consider ai as a possible winner before i moves, ai is no longer a possible
winner for j after i moves, as
s′a−j(ai) = sa−j(ai)− 1 < β(s(f(a))).
3. If this is the first move of i then this is immediate. Otherwise, by
induction on Lemma 2 and (5), if a′i i ai, then i would prefer to vote
for a′i in his previous move, rather than to ai.
4. As in (1), if i votes for ai = f(a) ∈ Hr+1(a), then ai is i’s most
preferred possible winner. Thus it cannot be locally dominated by any
other candidate.
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5. Since by (3) the score of the winner never decreases, the only way to
expand Wj(a, r) is if some voter i added a vote to a candidate not
in Wj(a, r). Recall that by Lemma 2, i only votes to candidates in
Wi(a, r). Since Wj(a, r),Wi(a, r) differ only by the votes of i and j,
the only candidate in Wi(a, r) \Wj(a, r) can be aj (the current vote of
j).
However if j already moved once then aj was a possible winner for j.
Since at time t aj /∈ Wj(a, r), then some voter must have deserted aj
before time t. Then by (2) no voter would consider aj a possible winner
after time t, and by Lemma 2, no voter would vote for it before t′.
Note that if j have never moved, then it is possible that qj is not a
possible winner for j, but still gets a vote later from i.
Finally, by property (2), each voter moves at most m − 1 times before the
game converges.
Lemma 5. Under the conditions of Theorem 4, either q is stable, or
in every state st we have |Hr+1(st)| > 1. Also, in the last state a either
|Hr(sa)| = 1, or all voters vote for possible winners. Any voter voting for
c /∈ Hr+1(st) prefers f(a) over any other candidate in Hr+1(st).
Proof. Note first that once |Hr+1(s)| = 1, there are no strategic moves, as no
candidate can challenge the winner. Thus a violation can occur only in the
last step. Assume, toward a contradiction, that in the last step a′i = f(a),
and |Hr(s)| = 1 (but |Hr+1(s)| > 1). However, since by (1) ai /∈ Hr+1(s),
each candidate in Hr+1(s) \ {f(a)} has the same score with and without i,
and this score is at most s(f(a))− (r + 1). Therefore f(a) also wins in any
state in Si(a, r) (no candidate is a threat to the winner). This means that
f(a) does not Si(a, r)-beat ai, in contradiction to a strategic move where
a′i = f(a).
Finally, suppose that there is more than one candidate in Hr(sa). Then
any voter i not voting for a possible winner sees himself potentially pivotal
between the winner and the runner-up (there is a possible state where the
runner-up wins if i keeps voting for ai). Since i always strictly prefer on of
them, this candidate will locally dominate ai.
We can further see that if |Hr(sa)| = 1, |Hr+1(sa)| > 1, then any voter
not voting for Hr+1(s) in equilibrium must favor the winner. Otherwise he
would be potentially pivotal between the current winner and a better possible
winner, and thus his most preferred possible winner would locally dominate
his current vote.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that all voters are of type r. Consider any
group scheduler such that (1) any voter has some chance of playing as a
singleton (i.e. this will occur eventually); (2) The scheduler always selects
(an arbitrary subset of) voters with type 2 moves, if such exist. Then con-
vergence is guaranteed from any initial state after at most O(nm) singleton
steps occur.
Proof. Denote Nw(a) =
⋃
a∈Hw(a){i : ai = a} i.e. all voters voting for the top
w candidates.
Note that there can be at most n(m − 1) consequent moves of type 2,
regardless of the scheduler. Let at
∗
be the state first reached when no voter
has a type 2 step. If the state at
∗
is stable, then we are done. Thus assume
it is not.
Consider a group N ′ that moves at time t. By property (2) of the sched-
uler, either all of N ′ has type 1 moves, or all of it has type 2 moves. Thus
we can classify all (group) steps to type 1 and type 2.
We define a chunk potential function α, where α(a) = −n× |Hr+1(a)|+
|Nr+1(a)|. That is, the potential increases as the set of possible winners
shrinks, but for a fixed size it increases with the total mass of voters for such
candidates.
Consider a sequence of moves after time t∗. A chunk is composed of a
type 1 step and all type-2 steps that follow until the next type 1 step (i.e.
a type 1 step and then zero or more type 2 steps). We claim that (a) after
every chunk α (as well as the score of the winner) does not decrease; (b) after
a finite number of chunks α strictly increases.
We observe that in any type 1 move a
N′→ a′, a′i = argmin{Qi(a) : a ∈
Hr+1(s)} for all i ∈ N ′. We will prove by induction that starting from t∗,
after every chunk a
N′→ a′ N′′→ · · · Nˆ→ aˆ:
1. maxa∈M sˆ(a) ≥ maxa∈M s(a). I.e., the score of the winner never de-
creases.
2. α(aˆ) ≥ α(a).
We prove this by a complete induction.
Consider the type 1 move of the chunk. All voters vote for less preferred
candidates, thus for all i ∈ N ′, s(a′i) ≥ s(ai). Moreover, a voter only moves
if ai /∈ Hr(a), since otherwise by he is potentially pivotal (as we show in
the proof of Th. 4). Case I: for any i ∈ N ′, there is no j s.t. a′j = ai. In
this case all moves are essentially independent, and every i s.t. ai /∈ Hr+1(a)
increases is added to Nr+1(a
′),thereby increasing α by 1. Every voter i s.t.
ai ∈ Hr+1(a) increases α by n, since ai /∈ Hr+1(a′). Thus in case I the chunk
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potential strictly increases, and there are no followup type 2 steps (the chunk
ends).
The problematic case is where there is I ⊆ N ′, s.t. for all i ∈ I there is
j ∈ N ′ with a′j = ai (see Figure A.7). If it also holds that ai ∈ Hr+1(a), then
after the move we have ai ∈ Hr+1(a′). Then we have that while ai was not a
possible winner for i before the step, it is a possible winner for i after the step.
Note however that only voters who moved can have a new possible winner,
and it can only be the candidate they deserted. It is then possible that voter
i now has a type 2 move. Thus some possibly empty subset I ′ ⊆ I have
type 2 moves, which is to return to their original candidates ai (deserting
other candidates in Hr+1(a
′)). After the first type 2 move there may other
voters I ′′ ⊆ I \ I ′ that want to return and so on. However no other voter has
a new type 2 move since all of N ′ \ I vote for their most preferred possible
winner in a′; and any i′ ∈ N \N ′ does not have a type 2 move since they did
not have one in a and there are no new possible winners.
So every further step 2 in the chunk rolls back some of the first type 1
steps. At the end of the chunk we are left with a set N ′′ = N ′ \ (I ′∪I ′′∪· · · ),
where N ′′ performed a type 1 step and all other voters vote as in a. If N ′′ 6= ∅
then by the previous case α strictly increases (and the score of the winner
does not decrease). Clearly if N ′′ = ∅ then aˆ = a and thus α does not change.
However note that the type 1 step is a set of disjoint cycles. For N ′′ to be
empty, each of these cycles must be contained completely in I ′ or I ′′, etc.: a
voter that does not roll back his action aj
j→ a′j at the same time with the
voter who joined aj, will not be able to roll back at a later type 2 step, since
aj will no longer be a possible winner for j. Thus a singleton type 2 move
(which cannot be a cycle) means that N ′′ 6= ∅.
Since eventually there will be singleton move (either type 1 or type 2), the
same cycle repeat forever, and α must increase. Clearly it cannot increase
more than nm times.
Proposition 7. Suppose that each voter i is of type L(r, ki) or T (r, ki),
where ki > r. Then a voting equilibrium exists. Moreover, in an iterative
setting where voters start from the truthful state, they will always converge
to an equilibrium in at most 3nm steps.
Proof. We first prove for truth-biased voters. Consider a T (r, ki) voter i. A
truth-bias move can only occur when i has no strategic moves. By Lemma 5,
|Hr+1(s)| > 1, and by Lemma 3 this means there are at least two possible
winners for i. If some of them locally dominate ai, then i would have a strate-
gic move. Thus if i makes a truth-bias move he is in one of two situations:
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Figure A.7: An example of a group scheduler, with r = 1. Voters 1,2,3 rank
d last, and rank their current vote first. In the initial state s = (1, 1, 1, 3), we
have Hr+1(s) = {a, b, c}. Step 1 is a compromise move, where N ′ = {1, 2, 3}.
After this move, a, b and c are all still possible winners. Now all three voters
have an opportunity move, which is to go back to their previous vote. If the
scheduler keeps selecting {1, 2, 3} then we would have a cycle going forever.
In this example the scheduler picks I ′ = {1} (step 2), which ends the chunk.
Now there is only one voter with a strategic move (voter 2), so the next
chunk has just one step. After step 3 no voter has a strategic move, so the
game is in equilibrium.
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(a) when i is already voting for his most preferred candidate in Hr+1(s); (b)
ai /∈ Hr+1(s), but none of the possible winners Si(a, r)-dominates ai. Denote
such moves by type-a and type-b, respectively.
We first argue that there are no type-a truth-bias moves. Indeed, we have
ai ∈ Hr+1(s) ⊆ Hki(s). If ai 6= f(a), there is a state s∗ ∈ Si(a, ki) where
ai wins if getting the vote of i, and otherwise f(a) wins. If ai = f(a), then
consider some other b ∈ Hr+1(s) (such a b exists according to Lemma 5).
Then there is a state s∗ ∈ Si(a, ki) where ai = f(a) wins if getting the vote
of i, and otherwise b wins. In either case, ai Si(a, ki)-beats qi, and thus there
is no type-a move. Note that this is where we apply the assumption that
ki > r.
Type-b moves are possible, and thus we need to show that invariants
(3) and (4) in the proof of Theorem 4 still hold. I.e., that a truth-bias
move cannot cause the winner to lose votes, and cannot expand the possible
winners set. Clearly the winner cannot lose score, since ai /∈ Hr+1(a). It is
left to show that a′i = qi cannot become a possible winner. Let N
′
qi
⊆ N be
all core supporters of qi that vote strategically in a. For all j ∈ N ′qi (including
i), when j deserted qi then qi was no longer a possible winner for j (i.e., its
score was at least r+2 below the winner). Since then, the score of the winner
does not decrease. Thus even if all of N ′qi return to qi, the gap between qi
and f(a) would be at least r + 2.
For the bound on the number of steps, denote by Ri, Ki ∈ N the number
of strategic moves and Truth-bias moves of voter i, respectively. Observe that
a strategic move can only occur after the set of possible winners shrinks—
unless it is the first move or it follows a truth-bias move. Thus Ri ≤ (Ki +
1) + (m− 1) ≤ Ki +m. A truth-bias can only come after the set of possible
winner shrinks as well, thus Ki ≤ m− 1. In total, Ri +Ki ≤ 2Ki +m ≤ 3m.
So all voters together can do at most 3nm moves.
We now turn to prove that convergence still holds when adding lazy-
biased voters. Assume first that |Hr+1(q)| > 1. Then the proof is essentially
the same, replacing qi with ⊥ for lazy-biased voters.
However the proof breaks when |Hr+1(q)| = 1, as “lazy” supporters of
the winner may abstain. Thus this case requires a special treatment. We
will show that every lazy voter plays at most once, and then the game ends.
Let kt be the gap between a∗ = f(q) and its closest runner-up (i.e.,
kt = min{k > 0 : Hk(st) 6= ∅}). By our assumption k0 > r + 1. At time
t, voter i = it will choose to abstain if and only if ki ≤ kt − 2. To see
why, if ki ≥ kt − 1, then a∗ Si(at, ki)-beats ⊥ (by removing ki votes from
a∗, i becomes pivotal between a∗ and the runner-up). However, a voter
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who already abstains, will choose to enter only if kt ≤ r + 1 (or kt ≤ r, for
supporters of a∗). Thus kt may either increase or decreases by 1 in every step.
However in any case kt cannot go below r+2. We can show this by induction:
the base case follows since |Hr+1(q)| = 1. In any later step, kt+1 < kt if and
only if a supporter i of a∗ abstains, which occurs iff r < ki ≤ kt − 2. Thus
kt ≥ r + 3, and kt+1 ≥ r + 2.
Finally, after each voter made his decision whether to abstain or not,
there are no strategic moves, as kt ≥ r + 2 entails |Hr+1(at)| = 1. In this
case, the game will converge after at most n moves.
Appendix B. Simulations
Appendix B.1. Distributions of preference profiles
• Uniform: Also known as the impartial culture distribution, this is
the simplest distribution to study. While people’s votes are rarely dis-
tributed at random, the uniform distribution allows more confidence
that our results are not particular and specific to the distributions an-
alyzed, and is thus often used in simulations of voting (Nurmi, 1992).
• Single-peaked: This distribution assigns each candidate a point on
the interval [0, 1], and each voter is randomly assigned a point on the
interval, which defines its preferences — it prefers candidates closer to
its point. This distribution has been long used in sociological and politi-
cal research (as resembling the common right-left political axis) (Kedar,
2014), but has also been widely examined in game theoretic scenarios.
A particular interesting property is that for single-peaked preferences
can be aggregated using strategy-proof mechanisms. The most promi-
nent such mechanism is the median vote (Sprumont, 1991).22
• Polya-Eggenberger urn: This model was developed and used to
model the grouping of much of society to major homogenous groups (Berg,
1985; Walsh, 2010; Rothe and Schend, 2012). In a k-urn model, k
preference orders are chosen, and an urn is built to let voters choose
preference orders from it. Each of the k chosen preferences gets 1
k+1
of
the preference orders in the urn, with remaining 1
k+1
of the urn filled
22We also tried simulations with single-dipped preferences, where the voter’s most pre-
ferred candidates are at the extreme. However, in such profiles the truthful vote has only
two candidates with positive support (the extremes), and no voter ever has an incentive
to move.
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by all non-selected preference orders. Preferences chosen from this urn
have significant likelihood to be of the k main groups. In this work, we
used the 2-urn and 3-urn model.
• Riffle: In a riffle model we get preferences of each voter by interleaving
two separate preference orders on subsets of candidates in an indepen-
dent manner. Huang and Guestrin (2009) showed real-world elections
which resembled this distribution.
• Placket-Luce: In the Placket-Luce model each candidate has an in-
trinsic cardinal value in the interval [0, 1] (the “ground truth”). Each
vote is then sampled from a particular distribution which adds noise to
the true ranking (Soufiani et al., 2012).
German election data. We used data from three polls based on the German
National Election Study, from 1969, 1972, and 1976.23 The German election
datasets had three candidates: The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP); we
used n = 100 voters whose preferences (from the six possible orders) were
taken from (Regenwetter et al., 2006).
PrefLib. We used all 225 complete preference profiles available from Pre-
fLib.org. Most instances have 3 or 4 candidates (over 10 in some), and
several hundred voters.
Appendix B.2. Methods
We simulated voting in an iterative setting, where voters start from a
particular state, and then iteratively make strategic moves until convergence.
We constructed a simulator that enables us to control the following features
of the simulation. First, determine the parameters of the preference profile:
• Number of voters. We used n ∈ {10, 20, 50} (also n = 100 in a few
simulations).
• Number of candidates. We used m ∈ {3, . . . , 8}.
• Distribution of preferences. We used all the 6 distributions described
above.
23Since these were election to the parliament and not a single-winner elections, it is
impossible to compare the simulation results to the actual outcome.
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Ignoring the n = 100 simulations, this defines 3 × 6 × 6 = 108 distinct
distributions. From each such distribution we generated 200 preference pro-
files, to a total of 21, 600 profiles. Then, we determine the parameters of the
strategic model:
• Distance metric used for accessibility relation. We used the `1 norm
and the multiplicative distance.
• The uncertainty parameter r which determines the radius of local dom-
inance. For the `1 distance, we varied r in {0, 1, . . . , 15}; for multiplica-
tive we varied r in { 1
n
, . . . , 4
n
, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}. We also used r = m as a
baseline value, where there is no strategic behavior (the outcome is the
truthful Plurality outcome).
• For voters with truth-bias or lazy-bias, the parameter k was varied as
well from r + 1 (or r + 1
n
for multiplicative) to 2r.
• The simulator allows the creation of voters of different types. However
in most of our simulations all voters had the same type (but different
preferences).
Finally, there are setting of the simulation itself:
• The initial voting profile. In most simulations this was the voters’
truthful profile.
• The scheduler. In most simulations we used a singleton scheduler,
which selects the next voter uniformly at random. We also used a
group scheduler, which randomly selects a subset of at most n/2 voters
and lets all of them make independent strategic moves (if they have
such).
Basic simulations. For each profile, we ran simulations with strategic voters
using the `1 metric, ranging the value of r. For each combination of preference
profiles and voters’ type, we repeated the simulation 100 times with a random
singleton scheduler, recording all the equilibria that were attained from this
profile. In this setting, we know by Theorem 4 that every simulation must
converge. For profiles with m ≤ 5, we conducted the same procedure with
the multiplicative metric as well.
Concurrent voting. We repeated a subset of the simulations above with a
group scheduler. We used all the above distributions, with n = 50,m = 5,
and all values of r. We then compared the results to the corresponding results
under a singleton scheduler.
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Random initial state. We repeated our simulations where the initial state
is sampled uniformly at random from all voting profiles (regardless of the
preference profile). Thus for each preference profile we ran 100 simulations,
each with a different initial state and a different scheduler.
Diverse types. Since actual societies are likely to contain voters of differ-
ent types, we repeated the same simulations with a diverse population. In
these simulations the value ri for each voter was sampled uniformly from
{0, 1, . . . , n/m}.
Note that in the three batches of simulations above, we had no formal
guarantee that the game converges. However, in practice all simulations
converged to an equilibrium.
Truth-biased and lazy-biased societies. For m ≤ 5 we repeated the simula-
tions while varying the values of k in addition to r. In that process we
simulated truth-biased and lazy-biased societies.
Non-truthful starting profiles. For n = 20,m = 4, we examined the possi-
bility of changing the the starting position of players to a random one. A
different starting profile was assigned every run of a profile (to enable exam-
ination how many different winners are reached using our dynamic).
Observed variables. For every generated profile, we measured the following
variables (all averaged over 100 simulations with a random singleton sched-
uler). We then averaged again over all 200 generated profiles of a given
distribution.
NumStep The number of steps from the initial (truthful) profile to conver-
gence.
NumStates The number of distinct equilibrium outcomes (for the same
preference profile), in terms of voting profiles.
NumWinners The number of distinct equilibrium outcomes (for the same
preference profile), in terms of winner’s identity.
WinnerConsistency The maximal fraction of simulations (for the same
preference profile) that ended with the same winner.
PluralityAgreement The fraction of simulations where the winner was the
original Plurality winner.
BordaAgreement The fraction of simulations where the winner was the
Borda winner.
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CoplandAgreement The fraction of simulations where the winner was the
Copland winner.
MaximinAgreement The fraction of simulations where the winner was the
Maximin winner.
CondorcetAgreement The fraction of simulations where the winner was
the Condorcet winner, when one exists (not counted otherwise).
SocialWelfare The relative rank of the winner, according to its borda score
(lower is better). Equivalently: the complement of the average social
welfare of voters, assuming Borda utilities.
Gap1-2 The ratio between the score of the winner and the score of the
runner-up (s(c1)/s(c2), where ci = argmaxc 6=cj ,j<i s(c).)
Gap2-3 The ratio between the score of the second and the third candidates
(s(c2)/s(c3)).
TotalDuverger Fraction of simulations where at most two candidates re-
ceived votes (1 iff s(c3) = 0).
RelativeDuverger The fraction of votes for the two leading candidates
((s(c1) + s(c2))/n).
For the Placket-Luce distribution, we also measured WinnerGroundRank,
which is the rank of the winner according to the ground truth used to generate
the profile (between 0 and m− 1).
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Figure B.8: Ratio of games where the winner was the same winner as
plurality for Riffle distribution simulation (PluralityAgreement)
Figure B.9: Improvement in the objective quality of the winner (Winner-
GroundRank), according to the ground truth. Note that when there is some
strategic interaction but not as much as in peak r, winner quality might
decrease.
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Figure B.10: Same as Figure B.9, but with random initial state. We can
see strategic behavior (around peak r) yields better outcome on average than
truthful voting, even when starting from a random state.
Figure B.11: The fraction of simulations in the single-peaked distribution,
where the winner is the median candidate (CondorcetAgreement), relatively
to the truthful baseline.
46
References
Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., Paolino, P., Rohde, D. W., 1992. “sophisticated”
voting in the 1988 presidential primaries. American Political Science Review
86 (01), 55–69.
Aldrich, J. H., 1993. Rational choice and turnout. American Journal of Political
Science, 246–278.
Alvarez, R. M., Nagler, J., 2000. A new approach for modelling strategic voting in
multiparty elections. British Journal of Political Science 30 (1), 57–75.
Apt, K. R., Simon, S., 2012. A classification of weakly acyclic games. In: SAGT’12.
pp. 1–12.
Aumann, R. J., 1995. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality.
Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1), 6–19.
Aumann, R. J., 1999. Interactive epistemology i: knowledge. International Journal
of Game Theory 28 (3), 263–300.
Berg, S., 1985. Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity.
Public Choice 47 (2), 377–387.
Bicchieri, C., Antonelli, G. A., 1995. Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality
and bounded knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 4 (2), pp.
145–167.
Brock, W. A., Durlauf, S. N., 2001. Discrete choice with social interactions. The
Review of Economic Studies 68 (2), 235–260.
Calvert, R. L., 1985. Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candi-
date motivations, uncertainty, and convergence. American Journal of Political
Science, 69–95.
Chopra, S., Pacuit, E., Parikh, R., 2004. Knowledge-theoretic properties of strate-
gic voting. Presented in JELIA-04, Lisbon, Portugal.
Conitzer, V., Walsh, T., Xia, L., 2011. Dominating manipulations in voting with
partial information. In: AAAI. Vol. 11. pp. 638–643.
Dekel, E., Piccione, M., 2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary
elections. Journal of Political Economy 108 (1), 34–55.
Desmedt, Y., Elkind, E., 2010. Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions. In:
ACM-EC’10. pp. 347–356.
47
Dhillon, A., Lockwood, B., 2004. When are plurality rule voting games dominance-
solvable? Games and Economic Behavior 46, 55–75.
Downs, A., 1957. An economic theory of democracy.
Dutta, B., Sen, A., 2012. Nash implementation with partially honest individuals.
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 154–169.
Duverger, M., 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State. New York: John Wiley. Y.
Edlin, A. S., Gelman, A., Kaplan, N., 2007. Voting as a rational choice: Why and
how people vote to improve the well-being of others. Rationality and society 1.
Falik, D., Meir, R., Tennenholtz, M., 2012. On coalitions and stable winners in
plurality. In: WINE’12. pp. 256–269.
Farquharson, R., 1969. Theory of Voting. Yale Uni. Press.
Feddersen, T. J., Sened, I., Wright, S. G., 1990. Rational voting and candidate
entry under plurality rule. American Journal of Political Science 34 (4), 1005–
1016.
Felsenthal, D. S., Rapoport, A., Maoz, Z., 1988. Tacit co-operation in three-
alternative non-cooperative voting games: a new model of sophisticated be-
haviour under the plurality procedure. Electoral Studies 7 (2), 143–161.
Ferejohn, J. A., Fiorina, M. P., 1974. The paradox of not voting: A decision
theoretic analysis. The American political science review, 525–536.
Fisher, S. D., 2004. Definition and measurement of tactical voting: the role of
rational choice. British Journal of Political Science 34 (1), 152–166.
Grandi, U., Loreggia, A., Rossi, F., Venable, K. B., Walsh, T., 2013. Restricted ma-
nipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and borda score. In: ADT’13.
pp. 181–192.
Huang, J., Guestrin, C., December 2009. Riffled independence for ranked data. In:
NIPS’09.
Johnson, E. J., Camerer, C., Sen, S., Rymon, T., 2002. Detecting failures of back-
ward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining. Journal
of Economic Theory 104 (1), 16–47.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., Thaler, R. H., 1991. Anomalies: The endowment
effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. The journal of economic perspectives
5 (1), 193–206.
48
Kedar, O., January 2014. Voting for Policy, Not Parties. Cambridge Studies in
Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Laslier, J.-F., 2009. The leader rule: A model of strategic approval voting in a
large electorate. Journal of Theoretical Politics 21 (1), 113–136.
Manski, C. F., 1993. Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection
problem. The review of economic studies 60 (3), 531–542.
McKelvey, R. D., Niemi, R., 1978. A multistage representation of sophisticated
voting for binary procedures. Journal of Economic Theory 18, 1–22.
Meir, R., Polukarov, M., Rosenschein, J. S., Jennings, N. R., 2010. Convergence
to equilibria in plurality voting. In: AAAI’10.
Merrill, S., 1982. Strategic voting in multicandidate elections under uncertainty
and under risk. In: Power, voting, and voting power. Springer, pp. 179–187.
Messner, M., Polborn, M. K., 2002. Robust political equilibria under plurality and
runoff rule. Mimeo, Bocconi University.
Myerson, R. B., Weber, R. J., 1993. A theory of voting equilibria. The American
Political Science Review 87 (1), 102–114.
Niemi, R. G., Frank, A. Q., 1982. Sophisticated voting under the plurality proce-
dure. In: Political Equilibrium. Springer, pp. 151–172.
Nurmi, H., 1992. An assessment of voting system simulations. Public Choice 73 (4),
459–487.
Obraztsova, S., Markakis, E., Thompson, D. R., 2013. Plurality voting with truth-
biased agents. In: SAGT’13. pp. 26–37.
Owen, G., Grofman, B., 1984. To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting.
Public Choice 42 (3), 311–325.
Palfrey, T. R., Rosenthal, H., 1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice
41 (1), 7–53.
Regenwetter, M., Grofman, B., Marley, A., Tsetlin, I., 2006. Behavioral social
choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reijngoud, A., Endriss, U., 2012. Voter response to iterated poll information. In:
AAMAS’12. pp. 635–644.
Reyhani, R., Wilson, M. C., Khazaei, J., 2012. Coordination via polling in plurality
voting games under inertia. In: COMSOC’12.
49
Riker, W. H., Ordeshook, P. C., 1968. A theory of the calculus of voting. The
American Political Science Review, 25–42.
Rothe, J., Schend, L., 2012. Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plural-
ity voting: An experimental approach. In: Experimental Algorithms. Springer
Verlag, pp. 356–368.
Sertel, M. R., Sanver, M. R., 2004. Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games
are the generalized condorcet winners. Social Choice and Welfare 22 (2), 331–
347.
Silberman, J., Durden, G., 1975. The rational behavior theory of voter participa-
tion. Public Choice 23 (1), 101–108.
Soufiani, H. A., Parkes, D. C., Xia, L., 2012. Preference elicitation for general
random utility models. In: NIPS’12. pp. 126–134.
Sprumont, Y., March 1991. The division problem with single-peaked preferences:
A characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59 (2), 509–519.
Thompson, D. R., Lev, O., Leyton-Brown, K., Rosenschein, J., 2013. Empirical
analysis of plurality election equilibria. In: AAMAS’13. pp. 391–398.
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. science 185 (4157), 1124–1131.
van Ditmarsch, H., Lang, J., Saffidine, A., 2013. Strategic voting and the logic of
knowledge. In: TARK’13. To appear.
Walsh, T., 2010. An empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable
voting. In: ECAI’10. pp. 257–262.
50
0% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
8% 
10% 
12% 
14% 
16% 
18% 
20% 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 max 
Increase in the number of votes to the two leaders  (Luce) 
Luce 5-10 
Luce 6-10 
Luce 7-10 
Luce 8-10 
Luce 5-20 
Luce 6-20 
Luce 7-20 
Luce 8-20 
Luce 5-50 
Luce 6-50 
Luce 7-50 
Figure B.12: The Difference between RelativeDuverger in the equilibrium
outcome (the fraction of voters voting for the two leaders), and the truthful
baseline.
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Figure B.13: Number of steps to convergence (NumStep).
51
